A wiretap protocol is a pair of randomized encoding and decoding functions such that knowledge of a bounded fraction of the encoding of a message reveals essentially no information about the message, while knowledge of the entire encoding reveals the message using the decoder. In this paper we study the notion of efficiently invertible extractors and show that a wiretap protocol can be constructed from such an extractor. We will then construct invertible extractors for symbol-fixing, affine, and general sources and apply them to create wiretap protocols with asymptotically optimal trade-offs between their rate (ratio of the length of the message versus its encoding) and resilience (ratio of the observed positions of the encoding and the length of the encoding). We will then apply our results to create wiretap protocols for challenging communication problems, such as active intruders who change portions of the encoding, network coding, and intruders observing arbitrary boolean functions of the encoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that Alice wants to send a message to Bob through a communication channel, and that the message is partially observable by an intruder. This scenario arises in various practical situations. For instance, in a packet network, the sequence transmitted by Alice through the channel can be fragmented into small packets at the source and/or along the way and different packets might be routed through different paths in the network in which an intruder may have compromised some of the intermediate routers. As another example, one can consider secure storage of data on a distributed medium that is physically accessible in parts by an intruder, or a sensitive file on a hard drive that is erased from the file system but is only partially overwritten with new or random information, and hence, is partially exposed to a malicious party.
The problem described above was first formalized by Wyner [1] and subsequently by Ozarow and Wyner [2] as an information-theoretic problem. In its most basic setting, this problem is known as the wiretap II problem (the description given here follows from [2] ) 1 : Consider a communication system with a source which outputs a sequence X = (X 1 , . . . , X m ) in F m 2 uniformly at random. A randomized algorithm, called the encoder, maps the output of the source Research supported by Swiss NSF grant 200020-115983/1 and Grant 228021-ECCSciEng of the European Research Council. 1 We will use the following notation: We denote the set {1, . . . , n} by [n]. For a vector x = (x 1 , . . . , xn) and a subset S ⊆ [n], we denote by x| S the projection of x onto the coordinate positions given by elements of S. If X and Y are random variables, then X|(Y = y) is the random variable X conditioned on the event Y = y. We use U S to denote the uniform distribution on the set S, Un as a short-hand for the case S = F n 2 , and X ∼ U S to denote a random variable with distribution U S . Two distributions A and B are called -close, in symbols A ∼ B, if their statistical distance is at most .
to a binary string Y ∈ F n 2 . The output of the encoder is then sent through a noiseless channel (called the direct channel) and is eventually delivered to a decoder D which maps Y back to X. Along the way, an intruder adversarially picks a subset S ⊆ [n] of size t ≤ n, and is allowed to observe Z := Y | S (through a so-called wiretap channel), i.e., Y on the coordinate positions corresponding to the set S. The goal is to make sure that the intruder learns as little as possible about X, regardless of the choice of S. The security of the system is defined by the conditional entropy ∆ := min S : |S|=t H(X|Z). When ∆ = m, the intruder obtains no information about the transmitted message and we have perfect privacy in the system. Moreover, when ∆ → m as m → ∞, we call the system asymptotically perfectly private.
A. Our Model
The model that we will be considering is motivated by the original wiretap channel problem but is more stringent in terms of its security requirements. In particular, instead of using Shannon entropy as a measure of uncertainty, we will rely on statistical indistinguishability which is a stronger measure that is more widely used in cryptography:
Definition 1: Let Σ be a set of size q, m and n be positive integers, and , γ > 0. A (t, , γ) q -resilient wiretap protocol of block length n and message length m is a pair of functions E : Σ m × F r 2 → Σ n (the encoder) and D : Σ n → Σ m (the decoder) that are computable in time polynomial in m, such that (Decodability:) For all x ∈ Σ m and all z ∈ F r 2 we have D(E(x, z)) = x, and, (Resiliency:) Let X ∼ U Σ m , R ∼ U r , and Y = E(X, R). For a set S ⊆ [n] and w ∈ Σ |S| , let X S,w denote the distribution of X conditioned on the event Y | S = w. Define the set of bad observations as
The encoding of a vector x ∈ Σ k is accomplished by choosing a vector Z ∈ F r 2 uniformly at random, and calculating E(x, Z). The quantities R = m/n, , and γ are called the rate, the error, and the leakage of the protocol, respectively. By a slight abuse of notation, we call δ = t/n the (relative) resilience of the protocol.
In our definition the imperfection of the protocol is captured by the two parameters and γ. When = γ = 0, the above definition coincides with the original wiretap channel problem for the case of perfect privacy. When γ = 0, we will have a worst-case guarantee, namely, that the intruder's views of the message before and after his observation are statistically close, regardless of the outcome of the observation. The significance of zero-leakage protocols is that they assure adaptive resiliency in the weak sense introduced in [3] for exposure-resilient functions: if the intruder is given the encoded sequence as an oracle that he can adaptively query at up to t coordinates and is afterwards presented with a challenge which is either the original message or an independent uniformly chosen random string, he will not be able to distinguish between the two cases.
In general, it is easy to verify that our model can be used to solve the original wiretap II problem, with ∆ ≥ m(1 − − γ). Hence, we will achieve asymptotically perfect privacy when + γ = o(1/m). For all the protocols that we present in this paper this quantity will be superpolynomially small.
B. Related Prior Work and Overview of Our Results
There are several interrelated notions that are closely related to our definition of the wiretap protocol. These are resilient functions (RF) and almost perfect resilient functions (APRF), exposure-resilient functions (ERF), and all-or-nothing transforms (AONT) (see [4] ). Among these, the closest to our wiretap protocols is the notion of AONTs, whose usefulness for the wiretap II problem of Wyner was observed in [3] . A randomized polynomial-time computable function f : F m 2 → F n 2 , (m ≤ n), is called a (statistical, non-adaptive, and secret-only) t-AONT with error if it is efficiently invertible and for every S ⊆ [n] such that |S| ≤ t, and all x 1 , x 2 ∈ F m 2 we have that the two distributions f (x 1 )| S and f (x 2 )| S are -close. An AONT with = 0 is called perfect. It is easy to see that perfectly private wiretap protocols are equivalent to perfect adaptive AONTs. It was shown in [3] that such functions can not exist (with positive, constant rate) when the adversary is allowed to observe more than half of the encoded bits. Any AONT immediately gives a wiretap protocol with respect to our definition, though with possibly positive leakage. Moreover, it is straightforward to see that average case AONTs, for which f (x 1 )| S and f (x 2 )| S are required to be close only for most choices of x 1 and x 2 are equivalent to our definition of wiretap protocols, up to a loss in the parameters. However, zero-leakage wiretap protocols are strictly stronger than average case AONTs. A simple universal transformation was proposed in [5] to obtain an AONT from any ERF, by one-time padding the message with a random string obtained from the ERF. This construction can also yield a wiretap protocol with zero leakage, but has the drawback of significantly weakening the rate-resilience tradeoff (as depicted in Fig. 1 ). Other concepts that are close to our work are that of privacy amplification (see, e.g., [6] , [7] , [8] ) and ramp secret sharing schemes [9] , [10] .
The main focus of this paper is on asymptotic trade-offs between the rate R and the resilience δ of an asymptotically perfectly private wiretap protocol over small alphabets. Following [2] , it is easy to see that in this case, an informationtheoretic bound R ≤ 1−δ +o(1) must hold. As implied by the work of Ozarow and Wyner [2] , the existence of an [n, k, d] qcode implies the existence of a perfectly private, (d−1, 0, 0) qresilient wiretap protocol of message length n − k and block length n. However, negative bounds on the rate-distance trade- Fig. 1 . A comparison of the rate vs. resilience trade-offs achieved by the wiretap protocols for the binary alphabet (left) and larger alphabets (right, in this example of size 64). (1) Information theoretic bound, attained by Theorem 7; (2) The bound approached by [12] ; (3) Protocol based on best nonexplicit binary linear codes [14] , [15] ; (4) AONT construction of [5] , assuming that the underlying ERF is optimal; (5) Random walk protocol of Corollary 4; (6) Protocol based on the best known explicit [16] and nonexplicit [14] , [15] linear codes. offs of codes do not allow the rate of the resulting protocols to approach the information theoretic upper bound. The tradeoff obtained by this construction is shown in Fig. 1 using Goppa's AG-codes (cf. [11] ) over F 64 (that surpass the Gilbert-Varshamov bound) as the underlying code. Moving away from perfect to asymptotically perfect privacy, it was shown in [12] that for any γ > 0 there exist binary asymptotically perfectly private wiretap protocols with R ≥ 1−2δ−γ and exponentially small error. This bound strictly improves the coding theoretic bound of Ozarow and Wyner for the binary alphabet. When the wiretap channel is stochastic, Thangaraj et al. [13] showed that capacity achieving channel codes can be used to attain secrecy capacity.
In this paper we introduce a notion of invertible extractors that serves as our main tool in designing asymptotically perfectly private wiretap protocols with negligible error. Our first construction in Section III achieves exponentially small error and, even for a fixed alphabet size, attains positive rate for every constant resilience δ ∈ [0, 1). Our second construction however (Theorem 7), achieves a rate that matches the information-theoretic upper bound (namely, R ≥ 1−δ −o(1)), for every prime power alphabet and every δ < 1, with zero leakage and negligible error.
In fact, our latter result holds in a more general setting in which the intruder is allowed to perform any linear preprocessing of Alice's message before making his observation. This propery allows one to completely separate the "secrecy" and "reliability" problems in any system involving linear components and yet attain an optimal performance. In sections V-A and V-B, we will demonstrate several important applications of this fact in the context of network coding and wiretapped communication in the presence of noise and active intruders. In particular we provide, for the first time, an optimal solution to the wiretap problem in network coding [17] without imposing any restrictive assumptions.
The final application in Section V-C studies an all-powerful intruder who is only limited by the amount of information he can obtain from Alice's encoded message, and not by the nature of the observations. We will show that in this case, if Alice and Bob have access to a side channel over which Alice can publicly send a polylogarithmic number of bits to Bob, then their communication on the main channel can be made secure.
II. INVERTING EXTRACTORS
In this section we will introduce the notion of invertible extractors and its connection with wiretap protocols. Later we will use this connection to construct wiretap protocols with good rate-resilience trade-offs. We begin by reviewing some of the basic notions in the theory of extractors (see, e.g., [18] for a more detailed account of these notions).
The min-entropy (in bits) of a distribution X with finite support S is defined as H ∞ (X ) := min x∈S {− log 2 Pr X (x)}. The statistical distance of two distributions X and Y defined on the same finite space S is given by 1
A q-ary symbol-fixing source with (q-ary) min-entropy k is the distribution of a random variable X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) ∈ [q] n , in which k of the coordinates (chosen arbitrarily) are uniformly and independently distributed on [q] and the rest take deterministic values. For q = 2, the source is called bitfixing. A generalization of this notion when q is a prime power is an affine source, which is defined as a uniform distribution on some k-dimensional affine subspace of F n q . A function f : [q] n → [q] m is a (k, ) symbol-fixing extractor (with error ) when for every q-ary symbol-fixing source X with min-entropy at least k, the distribution of f (X ) isclose to uniform. Affine extractors are defined similarly but for affine sources. For general sources, any extractor necessarily needs a random seed, which gives rise to the notion of seeded extractors. Namely, a function f : F n 2 × F d 2 → F m 2 is a (strong and seeded) (k, )-extractor with seed length d if for every distribution X with min-entropy at least k and random seed Y ∼ U d , the distribution of (Y, f (X , Y )) is -close to U d+m . A seeded extractor is called linear if it is a linear function for every fixed choice of the seed. We define the notion of an invertible (seeded or seedless) extractor as an extractor that is also equipped with an efficient (i.e., worst case polynomial time) inverter defined below:
Definition 2: Let Σ be a finite alphabet and f be a mapping from Σ n to Σ m . For γ ≥ 0, a function A : Σ m × F r 2 → Σ n is called a γ-inverter for f if the following conditions hold: (Inversion:) Given x ∈ Σ m such that f −1 (x) is nonempty, and for every z ∈ F r 2 , we have f (A(x, z)) = x, and, (Uniformity:)
We call a mapping γ-invertible if it has an efficient γinverter, and drop the prefix γ from the notation when γ = 0.
The idea of random pre-image sampling was also proposed in [3] for construction of adaptive AONTs from APRFs. However, for their purposes they need perfect inverters (i.e., γ = 0) that are not necessarily efficient. As wiretap protocols are weaker than (worst-case) AONTs, they can be constructed from slightly imperfect inverters as shown by the following lemma (The proof is straightforward, and is omitted due to space restrictions 2 ):
Lemma 3: Let Σ be an alphabet of size q > 1 and f : Σ n → Σ m be a (γ 2 /2)-invertible q-ary (k, ) symbol-fixing extractor. Then, f and its inverter can be seen as a decoder/encoder pair for an (n − k, + γ, γ) q -resilient wiretap protocol with block length n and message length m.
III. A WIRETAP PROTOCOL BASED ON RANDOM WALKS
In this section we describe a wiretap protocol that achieves a rate R within a constant fraction of the information theoretically optimal value 1 − δ (the constant depending on the alphabet size). To achieve our result, we will modify the symbol-fixing extractor of Kamp and Zuckerman [19] to make it efficiently invertible without affecting its extraction properties, and then apply Lemma 3 above to obtain the desired wiretap protocol. Namely we consider the following construction: It is straightforward to check that Inv is indeed a valid inverter for SFExt. Moreover, Using arguments similar to the original construction of [19] , one can show that, for every k > 0, the function SFExt above is a d-ary (k, 2 s/2 ) symbolfixing extractor, where
Combining this with Lemma 3 and setting up the the right asymptotic parameters, we can obtain the following result, provided that G is taken from a "sufficiently dense" family of expander graphs (we omit the proof):
Corollary 4: For every constants δ, γ > 0 and integer n > 0 there is a (δn, 2 −Ω(n) , 0) d -resilient wiretap protocol with block length n and rate
In particular, if we instantiate the Corollary with a family of Ramanujan graphs (e.g., [20] ), we can obtain α ≥ 1−2/ log d, which can be made arbitrarily close to one (hence, making the protocol arbitrarily close to the optimal bound) by choosing a suitable alphabet size that does not depend on n.
IV. INVERTIBLE AFFINE EXTRACTORS AND ASYMPTOTICALLY OPTIMAL WIRETAP PROTOCOLS
In this section we will construct a black box transformation for making certain seedless extractors invertible. Here we describe the method specifically for affine extractors, which leads to wiretap protocols with asymptotically optimal rateresilience trade-offs. The main ingredients of our construction are Bourgain's affine extractor [21] , and an improvement of Trevisan's [22] extractor due to Raz et al. [23] . These results are summerized in the following theorems:
Theorem 5: [23] There is an explicit strong linear seeded (k, )-extractor Ext :
Theorem 6: [21] 3 For every constant 0 < δ ≤ 1, there is an explicit affine extractor AExt : F n 2 → F m 2 for min-entropy δn with output length m = Ω(n) and error at most 2 −Ω(m) .
Using these tools, we are ready to describe our construction of invertible affine extractors:
Construction 2: For arbitrary constant parameters α, δ > 0, define the function f : F n 2 → F m 2 as follows: Let := 2 −n α/3 , and t := O(log 3 (n/ )) = O(n α ) be the seed length required by the extractor Ext in Theorem 5 for input length n and error , and further, let n := n − t. Set up Ext for input length n , min-entropy δn − t, seed length t and error . Also set up Bourgain's extractor AExt for input length n and entropy rate δ , for an arbitrary constant δ < δ. Then the function f will view the n-bit input sequence as a tuple (s, x), s ∈ F t 2 and x ∈ F n 2 , and outputs Ext(x, s + AExt(x)| [t] ). Moreover, the inverter Inv works as follows: Given y ∈ F m 2 , first it picks Z ∈ F t 2 uniformly at random. The seeded extractor Ext, given the seed Z is a linear function Ext Z : F n 2 → F m 2 . Then the inverter picks X ∈ F n 2 uniformly at random from the affine subspace defined by the linear constraint Ext Z (X) = y, and outputs (Z + AExt(X)| [t] , X).
The output length of the functin f described above satisfies m = δn − O(n α ). The proof that this function is indeed an affine (δn, O( ))-extractor and that Inv is a valid inverter for f is omitted, but uses standard tools in the theory of extractors. This combined with Lemma 3 and the fact that an affine extractor is in particular, a symbol-fixing extractor, immediately gives an almost optimal wiretap protocol:
Theorem 7: Let δ ∈ [0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1/3) be constants. Then for a prime power q > 1 and every large enough n there is a (δn, O(2 −n α ), 0) q -resilient wiretap protocol with block length n and rate 1 − δ − o(1).
V. FURTHER APPLICATIONS

A. Noisy Channels and Active Intruders
Suppose that Alice wants to transmit a particular sequence to Bob through a noisy channel, and that there is an intruder who can partially observe the transmitted sequence and even manipulate it. Modification of the sequence by the intruder can be regarded in the same way as the channel noise; thus one gets security against active intrusion by constructing a code that is resilient against noise and passive eavesdropping. A natural approach to construct such a code is serial concatenation of a wiretap encoder with an error-correcting code. However, in general there is no guarantee that these two components match one another. Namely, if the wiretap encoder is used as the inner code, it may disrupt the error-correcting functionality of the outer code, while if it is used as the outer code, it is possible that the "post-processing" of the information done by the error-correcting code leaks useful information about the original message to a potential intruder. However, the wiretap protocol given in Theorem 7 is constructed from an invertible affine extractor, and thus guarantees resiliency even if the intruder is allowed to observe arbitrary linear combinations of the transmitted sequence. Therefore, it can be reliably used as an outer code provided that the inner error-correcting code is linear. Since the wiretap protocol achieves the optimal rate, the combination of the wiretap encoder and the channel code achieves the capacity of the wiretapped channel, provided that the inner code is capacity achieving for the direct channel.
B. Network Coding
Our wiretap protocol from invertible affine extractors is also applicable in the more general setting of transmission over networks. A communication network can be modeled as a directed graph, in which nodes represent the network devices and information is transmitted along the edges. One particular node is identified as the source and m nodes are identified as receivers. The main problem in network coding is to have the source reliably transmit information to the receivers at the highest possible rate, while allowing the intermediate nodes arbitrarily process the information along the way. Suppose that the min-cut from the source to each receiver is n. It is known that the source can transmit information up to rate n to all receivers, even using linear network coding (See [24] for a comprehensive account of this and other relevant results).
Designing wiretap protocols for networks is an important question in network coding, which was first posed by Cai and Yeung [17] . In this problem, an intruder can choose a bounded number, say t, of the edges and eavesdrop all the packets going through those edges. They designed a network code that could provide the optimal multicast rate of n − t with perfect privacy. However this code requires an alphabet size of order |E| t , where E is the set of edges. Their result was later improved in [25] who showed that a random linear coding scheme can provide privacy with a much smaller alphabet size if one is willing to achieve a slightly suboptimal rate. Namely, they obtain rate n − t(1 + ) with an alphabet of size roughly Θ(|E| 1/ ), and show that achieving the exact optimal rate is not possible with small alphabet size. El Rouayheb and Soljanin [26] suggested to use the original code of Ozarow and Wyner [2] as an outer code at the source and showed that a careful choice of the network code can provide optimal rate with perfect privacy, with an alphabet of size |E|−1 t−1 + m. Building upon this work, Silva and Kschischang [27] constructed an outer code that provides similar results while leaving the underlying network code unchanged. However, their protocol imposes the assumption that the packets in the network are transmitted in bundles of length at least n, (hence, one needs to have an estimate of the min-cut size of the network), which bounds the intruder to observe the same set of links within each bundle, practically enlarging the field size from q to at least q n .
By directly using the protocol given in Theorem 7 as an outer-code in the source node, one can construct an asymptotically optimal wiretap protocol for networks that works with any alphabet size, is completely unaware of the network and eliminates all the restrictions in the above results. Similar to the case of active intrusion, this is due to the fact that our wiretap protocol is based on an affine extractor and preserves its security in presence of any (arbitrary) linear processing.
C. Arbitrary Processing
Suppose that the information emitted by a source goes through an arbitrary communication medium and is arbitrarily processed on the way before reaching the destination. Now consider an intruder who is able to eavesdrop a bounded amount of information at various points of the channel. One can model this scenario in the same way as the original pointto-point wiretap channel problem, with the difference that instead of observing t arbitrarily chosen bits, the intruder now gets to choose an arbitrary circuit C with t output bits (which captures the accumulation of all the intermediate processing) and observes the output of the circuit when applied to the transmitted sequence. Obviously there is no way to guarantee resiliency in this setting, since the intruder can simply choose C to compute t output bits of the wiretap decoder. However, suppose that in addition there is an auxiliary (and public) communication channel between the source and the receiver (that we call the side channel) that is separated from the main channel, and hence, the information passed through the two channel do not blend together by intermediate processings.
We naturally extend the notion of invertible extractors to seeded extractors and observe that they can be used for the general scenario described above. In particular, we obtain the following protocol for a target resilience parameter δ < 1 and arbitrarily small parameters α, > 0:
Construction 3: Set up the linear seeded extractor of Theorem 5 for input length n, seed length d = O(log 3 (n/ )), min-entropy n(1 − δ − α), and output length m = n(1 − δ − α) − O(d). Then the encoder chooses a seed Z for the extractor uniformly at random and sends it through the side channel. For the chosen value of Z, the extractor is a linear function, and as before, given a message x ∈ F m 2 , the encoder picks a random vector in the affine subspace that is mapped by this linear function to x and sends it through the public channel. The decoder simply applies the extractor to the seed received from the side channel and the transmitted string.
It is straightforward to see that the above protocol has leakage at most 2 −αn + when the intruder observes up to a δ fraction of the entire communication, and achieves rate 1 − δ − α − o(1) which can be made arbitrarily close to the information theoretic optimum, while sending merely O(log 3 (n/ )) bits through the side channel.
We remark that strong seeded extractors were used in [5] to construct ERFs, and this is exactly what we use as the decoder in our protocol. Moreover, when the general protocol above is used for the original wiretap II problem, there is no need for a separate side channel and the entire encoding can be transmitted through a single channel. Contrary to Theorem 7 however, the general protocol will not guarantee zero leakage even for this special case.
